The ontological status of intentional states: Nailing folk psychology to its perch

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):507 (1988)
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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Language of Thought.Jerry Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.

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