- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Did Freud rely on the tally argument to meet the argument from suggestibility?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (2):230-231 (1986)
Abstract
This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)Other Versions
No versions found
My notes
Similar books and articles
Tallying the “tally argument”: What next?Sam S. Rakover - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):727-729.
Does the tally argument make Freud a sophisticated methodologist?A. A. Derksen - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):75-101.
Hypnosis and social suggestibility.William E. Edmonston - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (3):470-471.
What is argument for? An adaptationist approach to argument and debate.David Pietraszewski - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):86-87.
Genes and genius from Galton to Freud.Dean Keith Simonton - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (3):406-407.
An argument for how to incentivise replication.Piers D. L. Howe & Amy Perfors - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.
Arbitrariness no argument against adaption.Mark Ridley - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):756-756.
Analytics
Added to PP
2014-01-20
Downloads
54 (#402,993)
6 months
17 (#177,229)
2014-01-20
Downloads
54 (#402,993)
6 months
17 (#177,229)
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Does the tally argument make Freud a sophisticated methodologist?A. A. Derksen - 1992 - Philosophy of Science 59 (1):75-101.
References found in this work
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The logic of scientific discovery.Karl Raimund Popper - 1934 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Hutchinson Publishing Group.
Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.Richard E. Nisbett & Lee Ross - 1980 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Prentice-Hall.
Progress and its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth.Larry Laudan - 1977 - University of California Press.
Conjectures and refutations: the growth of scientific knowledge.Karl Raimund Popper - 1965 - New York: Routledge.
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-667477cd97-sfdq8 dc2