A (Partial) Peircean Defense of the Cosmological Argument

Philosophia Christi 16 (1):193-205 (2014)
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Abstract

William Rowe’s criticism of the cosmological argument takes aim at the argument’s reliance on the principle of sufficient reason. In this short paper, I outline out how C. S. Peirce’s insights regarding abductive reasoning might be useful in defending the cosmological argument against Rowe’s worry concerning the principle of sufficient reason and the role it plays in the argument.

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2018-11-12

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J. Caleb Clanton
Vanderbilt University

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