Cartesian Explanation

In Descartes’s Theory of Mind. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2003)
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Abstract

Descartes argued that the model for genuine explanation is provided by natural philosophy and that scholastic theories that appeal to substantial forms or real qualities are pseudo‐explanations. Thus, one cannot explain mental acts by reference to a mental substance. The intractability of mind–body interaction illustrates the limits of our explanatory success to date.

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