How reason can be practical: A reply to Hume

Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 94 (1):213-230 (2007)
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Abstract

Opponents of Humean skepticism about practical reason do not normally exploit his idea that beliefs can only serve the aims we have. Many have used that idea to argue in favour of Humean skepticism. Others have denied that it supports Humean skepticism. I argue that we need to use this idea. It is only by embracing the so-called Humean Theory of Motivation that we can truly see where Hume went wrong.

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Philip Clark
University of Toronto, Mississauga

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