Stability and explicitness: In defense of implicit representation

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):151-152 (1999)
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Abstract

Electronic Mail: jimenez@usc.es Abstract Stability of activation, while it may be necessary for information to become available to consciousness, is not sufficient to produce phenomenal experience. We suggest that consciousness involves access to information and that access makes information symbolic. From this perspective, implicit representations exist, and are best thought of as sub-symbolic. Crucially, such representations can be causally efficacious in the absence of consciousness

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