Ethical Internalism and Cognitive Theories of Motivation

Philosophical Studies 129 (2):295-315 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Cognitive internalism is the view that moral judgments are both cognitive and motivating. Philosophers have found cognitive internalism to be attractive in part because it seems to offer support for the idea that moral reasons are categorical, that is, independent of agents’ desires. In this paper, I argue that it offers no such support.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1007/s11098-004-1643-0

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,518

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Moral internalism and moral cognitivism in Hume’s metaethics.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):353 - 370.
The emotional basis of moral judgments.Jesse Prinz - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):29-43.
Is Moral Internalism Supported by Folk Intuitions?Caj Strandberg & Fredrik Björklund - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):319-335.
Aesthetic judgements and motivation.Alfred Archer - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (6):1-22.
Psychopathy, Empathy & Moral Motivation.A. E. Denham - 2011 - In Justin Broackes (ed.), Iris Murdoch, Philosopher. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Methodological naturalism and epistemic internalism.Gregory Wheeler & Luís Moniz Pereira - 2008 - Synthese 163 (3):315-328.
Ethical Internalism: A Critical Examination.Martin Paul Willard - 1984 - Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University
Expressivism and Dispositional Desires.Caj Strandberg - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1):81-91.
Reasons for emotion and moral motivation.Reid Blackman - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):805-827.
Kant’s Analysis of Obligation: The Argument of Foundations I.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1989 - The Monist 72 (3):311-340.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
158 (#147,069)

6 months
11 (#370,490)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Add more citations

References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael R. Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics.David Owen Brink - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.Simon Blackburn - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.

View all 27 references / Add more references