Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind

Minds and Machines 20 (3):423-439 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We first discuss Michael Dummett’s philosophy of mathematics and Robert Brandom’s philosophy of language to demonstrate that inferentialism entails the falsity of Church’s Thesis and, as a consequence, the Computational Theory of Mind. This amounts to an entirely novel critique of mechanism in the philosophy of mind, one we show to have tremendous advantages over the traditional Lucas-Penrose argument

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,809

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-07-31

Downloads
595 (#45,116)

6 months
21 (#139,367)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jon Cogburn
Louisiana State University

References found in this work

The logical basis of metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Minds and Machines.Hilary Putnam - 1960 - In Sidney Hook (ed.), Dimensions Of Mind: A Symposium. NY: NEW YORK University Press. pp. 138-164.
The taming of the true.Neil Tennant - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 24 references / Add more references