Abstract

There is a well‐established asymmetry in our judgments of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) in sports and in other competitive activities. When an athlete is found using such drugs, it is a scandal that prompts public outrage, fan disappointment, and even loss of title. It seems that we judge enhanced results cannot be genuinely attributed to athletes. There is no similar reaction to use of PEDs in art, science, music, literature, business, and other human endeavors. The question I tackle in this paper is whether this disanalogy is justified: Is there some underlying difference in virtue of which PEDs should be thus stigmatized in sports but not elsewhere? I survey a couple of potential justifications that I find lacking. I then consider the difference in our judgments of the participation of superman‐like characters in sports (which we censure) and in other activities (which we endorse). I argue that the fact that the athlete is human is relevant to the value of sports—and by extension, the status of the effort involved—while this fact plays no significant role with regard to the value of other activities and that this difference in the value of activities ultimately justifies our differing judgments here. I then return to my initial question and examine whether similar appeal to what is human can justify the varying judgments of the use of PEDs. I argue that it can but only under certain assumptions. I conclude by discussing wider implication of my suggestion.