Knowledge, speaker and subject

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):199–212 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I contrast two solutions to the lottery paradox concerning knowledge: contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism. I defend contextualism against an objection that it cannot explain how 'knows' and its cognates function inside propositional attitude reports. I then argue that subject-sensitive invariantism fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the paradox.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,937

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
113 (#189,640)

6 months
10 (#407,001)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.
Contextualism and warranted assertibility manoeuvres.Jessica Brown - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.
Knowledge claims and context: loose use.Wayne A. Davis - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (3):395-438.
Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Motivated contextualism.David Henderson - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):119 - 131.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

On the linguistic basis for contextualism.Jason Stanley - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):119-146.
Are Knowledge Claims Indexical?Wayne A. Davis - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):257-281.

Add more references