Evolutionary Debunking and Normative Arguments Against Theism

Sophia 61 (3):521-532 (2022)
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Abstract

The levers of natural selection are random genetic mutation, fitness for survival, and reproductive success. Defenders of the evolutionary debunking account (EDA) hold that such mechanisms aren’t likely to produce cognitive faculties that reliably form true moral beliefs. So, according to EDA, given that our cognitive faculties are a product of unguided natural selection, we should be in doubt about the reliability of our moral cognition. Let the term ‘sanspsychism’ describe the view that no supramundane consciousness exists. In arguing against theism, some sanspsychists advance a normative claim about the moral significance of phenomena like sentient suffering. But if no supramundane consciousness exists, our cognitive faculties are a product of unguided natural selection. It follows that if EDA is correct, the sanspsychist should not think that our moral cognition is reliable. So unless the sanspsychist has a defeater for EDA, she should not think herself justified in appealing to normative reasons for denying the existence of God.

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Scott Coley
Mount St. Mary's University

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A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
19 The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism.William Rowe - 1999 - In Eleonore Stump & Michael J. Murray, Philosophy of Religion: The Big Questions. Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 6--157.

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