Errors through misidentification and the specialness of first-person thought

Philosophical Psychology (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This introduction offers a brief overview of the significance of (immunity) to error through misidentification for debates about first-person thought. The introduction also presents the special issue’s contents.

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2025-01-19

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Author Profiles

Annalisa Coliva
University of California, Irvine
Michele Palmira
Complutense University of Madrid

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References found in this work

Self-reference and self-awareness.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.
The unreliability of naive introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.
The first person.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1975 - In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and language. Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. pp. 45–65.

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