Abstract

In this work I defend a dualist philosophy of mind by invoking both dialectical and phenomenological considerations. I argue that there is no plausible reason to believe that the necessary condition of type-type identity theories--that there exist one-one correspondences between mental and physical phenomena--is fulfilled. Furthermore, all versions of materialism are falsified on the basis of discernibility: at least some occurrent mental states are revealed by direct acquaintance as having no extension in space, and such simplicity is contrary to the geometrical complexity possessed by all physical states. Functionalism is also rejected as an adequate alternative in that it fails to elucidate properly the essence of mentality. ;I reach five positive conclusions regarding the nature of mind. First, occurrent mental states, when given as simple, are unanalyzable, and hence mistaken beliefs about their intrinsic natures cannot be formed. Second, insofar as others cannot have direct access to one's mental states, the semantics of psychological discourse as embodied in ordinary language is in need of replacement. Third, because contrary sorts of properties must be exemplified by contrary sorts of particulars, ontic dualism is true. Fourth, the irreducibility of sensations to bodily states is harmonized with our tendency to locate them in physical space. Fifth, non-Cartesian interactionism, the doctrine according to which certain mental states, in conjunction with certain physical states, are causally efficacious, is true.