Abstract

The dissertation is an effort to investigate both some classical philosophical problems and also the nature of philosophy itself by showing that two philosophers ordinarily regarded as opposed are in fact basically agreed on the question which was at the center of the work of each, the question of the nature and well-being of man. ;The two philosophers are Benedict Spinoza and Soren Kierkegaard, and the investigation begins by asserting that they are in general agreement about man's well-being, both holding that it depends upon man's consciousness of eternity. ;An apparent disagreement appears, however, about the proper sort of consciousness of eternity which is vital to man's well-being or virtue. Spinoza and Kierkegaard each put forth a basic concept of man's virtue; Spinoza claiming that "acquiescentia" is man's proper state and Kierkegaard advocating the countering concept of "faith." The second chapter investigates the emergence of these polar concepts, showing among other things that the polarity turns on the question of whether or not any finite or particular thing can be eternal. ;The third chapter pauses to observe the dialectical character of the disagreement in terms of its implications for major fields such as science, art, and law and for philosophical method itself. ;The fourth chapter then shows that the polarity separating Spinoza and Kierkegaard at this intermediate level is superseded by renewed agreement at a still more basic level when it becomes apparent that the two concepts, acquiescentia and faith, which seemed opposed at the second level, each actually encompass both poles of the disagreement, so that Spinoza and Kierkegaard end, as they began, in agreement about man's nature and well-being