Abstract

The focus of this study is on the methodological aspects of Chomsky's linguistic theory. By explicating the philosophy of science implicit in Chomsky's work, a framework is provided that not only clarifies the logical structure of Chomsky's thought but also places his philosophical assumptions on a firm foundation. ;Chomsky's philosophy of science is interpreted as a rationalist synthesis of four basic conceptions of the natural and human sciences. From logical positivism Chomsky derives his formalism, which asserts that explanations in science are deductive-nomological in form and that scientific theorizing relies on the construction of mathematical-theoretical models. From Weltanschauungen analysis Chomsky derives his views on the theory-laden nature of scientific knowledge and his emphasis on a logic of discovery as the model for hypothesis formulation. Chomsky accepts both the classical empiricist thesis that a methodological unity exists between the natural and human sciences and the classical interpretationist thesis that the analysis of social and psychological phenomena requires the postulation of mentalistic states. ;These four themes are developed and synthesized in this study by a detailed comparison of the Chomskyan corpus with the works of Hanson, Peirce, and Lakatos. The resulting methodological framework is then applied to a defense of Chomsky's major epistemological themes. Chomsky's technical, historical, and philosophical writings are then systematized and strengthened by the resulting analysis