Abstract

An examination of the phenomenon of forgetting is revelatory with respect to both the nature of the human soul and the level of knowledge of which the soul is capable. Forgetting cannot be comprehended as simply the opposite of memory. Forgetting has to be treated as a set of primary concepts if the most fundamental questions about it are to be meaningfully addressed. ;Several different Greek terms, all of which are translated into English as "forgetting," can be found to play different roles in Plato's dialogues. The dialogues themselves can be interpreted as maintaining different levels of forgetting and different types of forgetting. Three main types are discussed: one set of forgetting terms refers to a hypothetical metaphysical condition; another set refers to an epistemological process; and a third set refers more strictly to functions of memory. ;The Platonic doctrine of Recollection does not directly inform the various conceptions of forgetting. It is rather the reverse: one particular type of forgetting is portrayed as a condition which necessitates Recollection. It is actually the hypothesis that this sort of forgetting has taken place which gives the Recollection doctrine its philosophical force. Belief in the relevant forgetting automatically initiates the believer into the essential premises and practices of philosophy. The ordinary experience of forgetfulness and the ordinary process of recollection capture the presuppositions and attitudes that happen to be--in themselves, in their ordinary form--quasi-philosophical: the cognitive move from a present thought or perception to something invisible, something lying behind appearances; and the isolation of pure intellectual activity. The Recollection doctrine ultimately serves to encourage the exercise of these quasi-philosophical operations in order to provide training, rehearsal, and practice for the essentials of philosophy. ;Many variations on this theme of forgetting find expression within a single dialogue: the Phaedrus. The Phaedrus can be read as an exploration of the relationship between philosophical forgettings and anti-philosophical memory. It shows, in sum, how the practice of philosophy depends upon the repudiation of memorizable "truths" and upon the affirmation of the "thinghood" of the invisible, the forgotten