An Afro-Communitarian Relational Theory of AI'S Moral Status

American Philosophical Quarterly 62 (2):173-189 (2025)
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Abstract

The rapid development of AI in recent years has brought the problem of AI's moral status to the fore. In this article, we combine Afro-communitarian ethics with a cognitive perspective and argue that some AI can hold a moral status to the extent that it can be both a subject and an object of communion. Further, different kinds of AI have different degrees of moral status, depending on their communal capacities. To demonstrate this, we show that AI can engage in moral behavior and be morally disposed to act in certain ways. We defend that this theory deserves consideration along with other theories of moral status.

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Jiawei Xu
Xiamen University

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References found in this work

The End of Personhood.Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby - 2023 - American Journal of Bioethics 24 (1):3-12.
Fellow Creatures. Our Obligations to the Other Animals.Christine M. Korsgaard - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1):165-168.

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