Abstract

This chapter questions whether the objective circumstances of justice, and in particular the assumption of mutual advantage, apply to climate action. The first part of the chapter explains why two asymmetries, of benefits and costs, further exacerbated by intergenerational conflicts, both past and future oriented, make climate change an intricate multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma. The second part of the chapter analyses whether and how the two asymmetries can be scaled down, based on a series of empirical arguments: global vulnerability to local economic setbacks, financial risks and security threats (benefit asymmetry), co-benefits of the energy transition immediately collectable, especially in developed and some emerging countries (cost asymmetry), moral, axiological and economic benefits of intergenerational sustainability (intergenerational conflicts). The conclusion is that the circumstances of justice, that make climate cooperation both possible and necessary, obtain, in spite of the two global asymmetries and of intergenerational conflicts.