Abstract

The best way to divide control over children’s education between private and state authorities is unclear. This task has ethical implications that this thesis explores—in the context of a pluralist liberal democracy. In cases where authority over children’s education is granted to private groups, like ethnic or religious minorities, rights are often part of the default vocabulary adopted by politically liberal commentaries. These rights are often viewed as a shield that offers the group immunity from state interference. Some illiberal minority groups argue that they need to be shielded from state interference because the persistence of their cultural or religious identity depends on it. For example, the Amish community in Wisconsin argued in Wisconsin v. Yoder that the future of their community would be jeopardized if they were forced to send their children to school beyond the age of fourteen. While a rights-based approach does explain many of the variables connected with cases like these, the explanation is incomplete. I will offer two clarifications to the rights-based view. First, in the event that a minority group is shielded from state interference, it is not clear that it would be morally legitimate for the group to take over the authority of the state. I will, then, offer a plausible theory that could justify the self-governing authority of minority groups in these situations. My second clarification is that the concept of individual autonomy, often the central liberal value protected by rights, is too broad to support a zero-tolerance approach toward illiberal groups. This indicates that illiberal minority groups might still have a claim to self-governing authority even though they arguably interfere with the autonomy of their children. Some interference with minor elements of individual autonomy should arguably be tolerated in cases where the ruination or assimilation of the group’s unique culture or religion is at stake.