Rewording the Rules on Disjunctive Probability

Metaphilosophy 47 (4-5):719-727 (2016)
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Abstract

Logic is a central and highly useful part of philosophy. Its value is particularly evident when it comes to keeping our thinking about disjunctive probabilities clear. Because of the two meanings of “or”, logic can show how the likelihood of a disjunction being true can be determined quite easily. To gauge the chance that one of two or more exclusive alternatives is true, one need only sum up their respective likelihoods. And to know the chance that at least one of two or more compatible alternatives is true, one simply has to figure the chance that it is false that all of them are false!

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