Free will and the soft constraints of reason

Ratio 19 (1):1-23 (2006)
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Abstract

This paper provides a new compatibilist definition of free will, which is an elaboration of the classic compatibilist view of free will as absence of restriction, with the help of the causal theory of action and some special categories. This new definition enables us to neutralize a very wide range of counterexamples in a systematic and compelling way, including those left unanswered by hierarchical definitions.1.

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Claudio Costa
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte

Citations of this work

Qual a motivação para se defender uma teoria causal da memória?César Schirmer Dos Santos - 2018 - In Juliano Santos do Carmo & Rogério F. Saucedo Corrêa, Linguagem e cognição. NEPFil. pp. 63-89.

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