Hypercomputation and the Physical Church‐Turing Thesis

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (2):181-223 (2003)
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Abstract

A version of the Church-Turing Thesis states that every effectively realizable physical system can be simulated by Turing Machines (‘Thesis P’). In this formulation the Thesis appears to be an empirical hypothesis, subject to physical falsification. We review the main approaches to computation beyond Turing definability (‘hypercomputation’): supertask, non-well-founded, analog, quantum, and retrocausal computation. The conclusions are that these models reduce to supertasks, i.e. infinite computation, and that even supertasks are no solution for recursive incomputability. This yields that the realization of hypercomputing devices is implausible, and that Thesis P is not essentially different from the standard Church-Turing Thesis.

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