Public Reason and the Hobbesian Dilemma

Hobbes Studies 20 (1):63-92 (2007)
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Abstract

Hobbesian accounts of public reason are forced to face a tension that is presented for any theorist that toes the Hobbesian line. This tension has been referred to as the “Hobbesian Dilemma.” On one horn, we are afraid that we might create a monster with our authorization of an absolute sovereign. On the other horn, we are afraid that if we do not hand over unlimited power to the sovereign we will not be freed from the conflict that is endemic to our reliance upon private pluralistic standards. These Hobbesians, stressing the first horn, are afraid of authorizing a supreme political entity, so they provide modifications that serve to restrict such an entity. Such modifications, however, necessarily reintroduce pluralism back into the commonwealth. But if we take Hobbes seriously and accept that pluralism generates a state of war, the reintroduction of pluralism must be viewed as disastrous

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Shane Courtland
University of Minnesota, Duluth

References found in this work

Public Reason.David Gauthier - 1995 - Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1):19-42.
Hobbesian public reason.Michael Ridge - 1998 - Ethics 108 (3):538-568.

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