The Shapley–Shubik power index for dichotomous multi-type games

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Theory and Decision 81 (3):413-426 (2016)
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Abstract

This work focuses on multi-type games in which there are a number of non-ordered types in the input, while the output consists of a single real value. When considering the dichotomous case, we extend the Shapley–Shubik power index and provide a full characterization of this extension. Our results generalize the literature on classical cooperative games.

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10.1007/s11238-016-9541-4

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On anonymous and weighted voting systems.Josep Freixas & Montserrat Pons - 2021 - Theory and Decision 91 (4):477-491.

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