Abstract

Fodor gained a certain amount of embarrassment in 1981 after realizing that the intentional integrity of the link between the concept and the cause may be questioned. While the older Fodor, the one in 1998, is able to acknowledge that his earlier conceptions had to be modified, Fodor emphasizes that acquiring a concept is not to be recognized as a psychological process. In this chapter, however, we look into how psychological processing plays, in fact, no small part in the acquisition of concepts and that cognitive psychology is capable of providing and should provide a theory regarding such. The author attempts to prove how Fodor's argument about how concepts are “brute-causally” attained and cannot be interminable, as well as to show how cognitive mediation can be obtained, and to defend the notion of acquisition from some of Fodor's criticisms on the subject of nonclassical theories about content and verificationism.