Abstract

Absolute creationism is a sort of theistic Platonism, which preserves intact the host of abstract objects but renders them dependent upon God. From its inception, absolute creationism has been dogged by a vicious circularity that has come to be known as the bootstrapping objection. Many philosophers, including the author, have taken the bootstrapping objection to be decisive against absolute creationism. But a review of the most sophisticated statement of the objection suggests a way out for the absolute creationist. By denying a constituent ontology the absolute creationist can avoid the vicious circularity, since explanatorily prior to his creation of properties God can be just as he is without exemplifying properties. Still, in light of the metaphysical idleness of such abstract entities, theists would be well advised to deny instead the Platonist’s presumed criterion of ontological commitment and so to avoid realism altogether.