Abstract

This paper deals with the semantic theory of indexicality expressed in Logical Investigations, integrating it with some aspects of John Perry’s work on the same topic. My intention is to show some unexpected affinities between these two studies and draw attention to the value of their different conclusions. In particular, I will refer to the problem of the role of intuition to understand whether and in which sense the context of utterance is semantically determining within the expressive act. Moreover I will try to clarify the way the indexical meaning is described by Husserl and Perry: their solutions are similar as far as they split the meaning sphere in a twofold partition – roughly consisting of a descriptive and indicating part on one hand, and a content on the other one – but nevertheless different because of the ontological status granted to the content. This will appear to be related to the different way they interpret their common choice to make the act, and not the object, the key of the argument.