The Communication Potential of Corporate Annual Reports of Companies

Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 46:11-16 (2018)
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Abstract

According to several philosophers of science, optimism concerning communication in science diminished in the shift from positivism to subjectivist philosophy of science. Communication in accounting is also a problem. In both cases there is a tension between objectivism and subjectivism. In science one of these approaches seems to prevail in different phases. In accounting there seems to be an oscillation or ambiguity between the two tendencies which remain side by side. As far as the information product of accounting namely corporate annual reports are concerned, a polarity seems to exist as the statutory financial reporting practices that produce statutory disclosures are influenced by objectivism, while the contextual financial reporting practices that produce contextual disclosures are inclined towards subjectivism. Subjectivism and objectivism can be interpreted as emphasizing certain modal aspects to the detriment of others. This is the case also as far as communication in accountancy is concerned. It is suggested that a balanced approach can be reached by paying attention to all the modalities, in particular to those which tend to be neglected under a certain approach. In addition, both objectivism and subjectivism tend to focus on what is subjected to the law/norms and to bypass the normative side of each aspect. Even in this case a “return” to the modal aspects as sources of modal laws and norms can be beneficial. This paper offers concrete examples of how to improve communication in corporate reports by taking into account the neglected modal aspects.

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