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From is to ought, and back: how normative concerns foster progress in reasoning research
Frontiers in Psychology 5 (2014)
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Citations of this work
Generalized Information Theory Meets Human Cognition: Introducing a Unified Framework to Model Uncertainty and Information Search.Vincenzo Crupi, Jonathan D. Nelson, Björn Meder, Gustavo Cevolani & Katya Tentori - 2018 - Cognitive Science 42 (5):1410-1456.
Critique of pure Bayesian cognitive science: A view from the philosophy of science.Vincenzo Crupi & Fabrizio Calzavarini - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (3):1-17.
Judging the Probability of Hypotheses Versus the Impact of Evidence: Which Form of Inductive Inference Is More Accurate and Time‐Consistent?Katya Tentori, Nick Chater & Vincenzo Crupi - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (3):758-778.
On the Reality of the Base-Rate Fallacy: A Logical Reconstruction of the Debate.Martina Calderisi - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
Prediction in forensic science: a critical examination of common understandings.Alex Biedermann, Silvia Bozza & Franco Taroni - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
References found in this work
Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):293-315.
Human reasoning and cognitive science.Keith Stenning & Michiel van Lambalgen - 2008 - Boston, USA: MIT Press.
A rational analysis of the selection task as optimal data selection.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 1994 - Psychological Review 101 (4):608-631.
Subtracting “ought” from “is”: Descriptivism versus normativism in the study of human thinking.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):233-248.
Epistemic Utility and Norms for Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):897-908.
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