As you were? Moral philosophy and the aetiology of moral experience

Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):117 – 132 (2006)
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Abstract

What is the significance of empirical work on moral judgement for moral philosophy? Although the more radical conclusions that some writers have attempted to draw from this work are overstated, few areas of moral philosophy can remain unaffected by it. The most important question it raises is in moral epistemology. Given the explanation of our moral experience, how far can we trust it? Responding to this, the view defended here emphasizes the interrelatedness of moral psychology and moral epistemology. On this view, the empirical study of moral judgement does have important implications for moral philosophy. But moral philosophy also has important implications for the empirical study of moral judgement.

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Garrett Cullity
Australian National University

Citations of this work

Making Psychology Normatively Significant.Regina A. Rini - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):257-274.
Moral Psychology and the Mencian Creature.David Morrow - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (3):281-304.
Disability and Moral Responsibility.Simo Vehmas - 2011 - TRAMES 15 (2):156-167.

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References found in this work

A Theory of Justice.John Rawls - 1971 - Oxford,: Harvard University Press. Edited by Steven M. Cahn.

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