Saying what we mean: an argument against expressivism

In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Clarendon Press (2006)
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original Cuneo, Terrence (2006) "“Saying what we Mean: An Argument against Expressivism". Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1():35-71

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Citations of this work

After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism.Stephen Ingram - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):227-248.
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The Phenomenological Objection to Fictionalism.Stuart Brock - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):574-592.
Moral assertion for expressivists.Mike Ridge - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):182-204.

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