Abstract

The problem of intentionality, which constitutes the basic theme of the book, has its roots in Brentano’s philosophical and psychological reflections. Intentionality refers to mental phenomena (perceptions, beliefs, desires, judgments etc.) being directed toward something. Intentionality plays a crucial role within phenomenological epistemology. Furthermore, it is one of the most important issues of analytic philosophy, particularly within analytically-oriented philosophies of mind and language. In the latter framework, intentionality constitutes, among other things, part of the pragmatic theory of language, which explains why the author at a certain point turns his attention to pragmatics. Clearly, the author does not limit his analysis to the nature of mental intentionality, but also touches on the relationship between intentionality and semantics. Here semantics is understood as the study of sense, reference and objects of reference, and the logical values of truth and falsity, which roughly corresponds to phenomenological and analytical semantics. What is analysed is the role of intentionality in the semantics of Frege and Husserl, intensional semantics and action theory semantics (other types of semantics, e.g. generative, cognitive and possible world semantics, are not mentioned). One of the questions posed by the author has to do with what it means for language to be intentional. What is more fundamental: should we speak about the intentionality of thought or the intentionality of language? Is intentionality an indispensable component of meaning in language? The nature of reference is also addressed: How can words and sentences refer to the world? What are the “mechanics” of reference? The author pays special attention to various theories of meaning, since it appears that an integral and competent theory of meaning should involve intentionality.