Naturalism and Inference: On the Need for a Theory of Material Inference

Dissertation, Vanderbilt University (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

My research centers on analytic pragmatist approaches to intentionality. One goal that defenders of such approaches set for themselves is to be able to provide a naturalistically sound account of intentionality without being pejoratively scientistic. Many critics argue that this is an unattainable goal, and I begin my dissertation by framing in neutral terms what I take to be the core of these criticsâ objection. I call this the Pincer Objection, and while surveying the works of four prominent analytic pragmatistsâDonald Davidson, John McDowell, Huw Price, and Robert BrandomâI argue that all of them fall prey to the Pincer Objection. The reason they fall prey to this objection is because within their semantic theories they give explanatory priority to the semantic properties of propositions. I argue that, as an analytic pragmatist, I should instead prioritize the semantic properties of inferences, and that once I do so I am faced with the question: How are materially valid inferences possible? Finally, I argue that if I can provide an answer to this question, then I can successfully address the Pincer Objection. In this manner, my dissertation is not directed towards answering this question, but instead towards establishing the naturalistic credentials of accounts of intentionality that take this question seriously.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,566

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-08-13

Downloads
39 (#623,172)

6 months
4 (#957,314)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Thomas Dabay
Vanderbilt University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
Epistemology Naturalized.W. V. Quine - 1969 - In Willard Van Orman Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.
Truth and meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.

View all 19 references / Add more references