Tun und Unterlassen im klinischen Entscheidungskonflikt: Perspektiven einer (nicht nur) theologischen Identitätsethik

Zeitschrift Für Evangelische Ethik 47 (1):33-52 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

To act and to refrain from actions comprises according to the logic of ethical consequentialism to be responsible in any case. This argument is particularly important in medical ethics: Setting actively limits to a life or permitting a long-term suffering of a patient is sometimes interpreted as equally important in the view of morals or ethics. The foundation of this argument is a one-sided theory of causation. The essay presented here tries to differentiate between the idea of causation in activities and the ascription of consequences of non-interference in certain cases. In former times nature presented reasons for nonintervention: God was at work. But when the idea of God is deficient in evidence in certain Western societies a qualified idea of life could replace the former basis of naturallaw or natural theology.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,888

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Death, ethical judgments and dignity.Katarína Komenská - 2018 - Ethics and Bioethics (in Central Europe) 8 (3-4):201-208.
Dank an Christofer Frey.Hartmut Kreß - 2009 - Zeitschrift Für Evangelische Ethik 53 (1):3-3.
Vernunftbegründung und biblische Begründung in der Ethik.Klaus Demmer - 1993 - Zeitschrift Für Evangelische Ethik 37 (1):10-21.
Making sense of freedom and responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Spinozian consequentialism of ethics of social consequences.Michaela Petrufová Joppová - 2018 - Ethics and Bioethics (in Central Europe) 8 (1-2):41-50.
Strafe und Schuld im Horizont von Reue und Vergebung.Traugott Koch - 1998 - Zeitschrift Für Evangelische Ethik 42 (1):110-121.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-01-11

Downloads
17 (#1,149,837)

6 months
7 (#704,497)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references