Abstract

This dissertation is a study of the principle of national self-determination and of the attempts that have been made to justify it in contemporary law and philosophy. Self-determination has been the primary basis for nationalist claims to sovereignty and territory over the last two centuries, but has yet to receive a philosophical critique. I maintain that there is no adequate justification of the principle. ;There are four ways in which national self-determination has recently been defended; each of these is subject to conceptual problems that undermine the case for the principle. First, there is a deontological defense that considers nations to be formally equivalent to peoples which have already been granted rights under international law. There is, however, a problem with arguing that nations should have the same rights as peoples, since these two categories designate significantly different kinds of social groups. Second, there is a consequentialist argument given by philosophers such as Joseph Raz that views self-determination as a moral right of nations which ensures the well-being of individual members of national groups. But this idea overlooks the fact that the creation of nation-states often undermines the ability of individuals to determine their own identities. ;Third, there is a consensual theory put forward principally by Harry Beran which maintains that there is a right of individuals to consent to citizenship and that this entails a corresponding right of nations to self-determination. The problem with this idea is that the application of consent to citizenship leads to coercive measures against individuals or groups who might not accept a separation between nationalities. Finally, a communitarian justification used by Michael Walzer bases the legitimacy of nationalist claims to territory on the idea that there should be a close connection between nations and states in order to ensure their cultural integrity and political sovereignty. But, if nations unilaterally assert rights to territory, this undermines their independence, since such assertions can be made with equal validity by all nations and thus cannot resolve disputes between them. I conclude that there is no adequate justification for a principle of national self-determination in contemporary philosophy or law