Bait and switch philosophy

Analysis 75 (3):372-379 (2015)
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Abstract

Many philosophers employ an intellectual division of labour. Philosophy tells us what the truth conditions of various philosophically interesting sentences are. For example, atomic sentences containing numerals are sentences containing singular terms putatively referring to numbers; sentences about what could be are sentences quantifying over possible worlds and so on. Some discipline outside of philosophy tells us that certain of these sentences are true. The purported result is that such philosophically controversial entities as numbers and possible worlds have been shown to exist. I criticize this ‘twin-track strategy’ and try to show that the two components conflict rather than complement each other

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Chris Daly
University of Manchester

Citations of this work

Ontological realism and sentential form.Eileen S. Nutting - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):5021-5036.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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