Two Anti-Platonist Strategies

Mind 119 (476):1107-1116 (2010)
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Abstract

This paper considers two strategies for undermining indispensability arguments for mathematical Platonism. We defend one strategy (the Trivial Strategy) against a criticism by Joseph Melia. In particular, we argue that the key example Melia uses against the Trivial Strategy fails. We then criticize Melia’s chosen strategy (the Weaseling Strategy.) The Weaseling Strategy attempts to show that it is not always inconsistent or irrational knowingly to assert p and deny an implication of p . We argue that Melia’s case for this strategy fails.

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Author Profiles

Simon Langford
United Arab Emirates University
Chris Daly
University of Manchester

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References found in this work

Response to Colyvan.Joseph Melia - 2002 - Mind 111 (441):75-80.
Syntactic reductionism.Richard Heck - 2000 - Philosophia Mathematica 8 (2):124-149.

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