Dropping the Catch

In Ethics without principles. New York: Oxford University Press (2004)
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Abstract

Argues that various standard meta-ethical positions have great difficulty in understanding the notion of a contributory reason, being largely formulated to deal with overall oughts. These positions are those of M. Smith, A. Gibbard, F. Jackson, B. Brandom, and I. Kant.

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10.1093/0199270023.003.0004

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Jonathan Dancy
University of Texas at Austin

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