Epistemic Rationality and the Value of Truth

Philosophical Review 133 (4):329-365 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Veritism is the idea that what makes a belief epistemically rational is that it is a fitting response to the value of truth. This idea promises to serve as the foundation for an elegant and systematic treatment of epistemic rationality, one that illuminates the importance of distinctively epistemic normative standards without sacrificing extensional adequacy. But this article proposes that veritism cannot fulfill this promise. It goes on to explain why not, in part by showing that three radically different developments of veritism—one consequentialist, one deontological, and one virtue-theoretic—face eerily similar problems. This article also attempts to provide a general explanation of why any version of veritism is doomed to fail. If these arguments are successful, their upshot is that we must look beyond the value of truth if we want to understand the nature and significance of epistemic rationality.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,401

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

In Defense of Veritism.Duncan Pritchard - 2021 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 58 (4):22-37.
Pritchard on Veritism and Trivial Truths.Anumita Shukla & Mayank Bora - 2024 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 41 (2):273-295.
Intellectually Virtuous Inquirer and the Practical Value of Truth.Sergei M. Levin - 2021 - Epistemology and Philosophy of Science 58 (4):54-59.
Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.
On the Distinctive Value of Knowledge.Kok Yong lee - 2020 - In Syraya Chin-Mu Yang & Robert H. Myers, Donald Davidson on Action, Mind and Value. Springer. pp. 107-127.

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-12-13

Downloads
164 (#145,904)

6 months
164 (#26,126)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Sophia Dandelet
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic norms on evidence-gathering.Carolina Flores & Elise Woodard - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2547-2571.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.
Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.

View all 36 references / Add more references