Abstract

The following argument in support of Peircean conservatism 1) contends that Peirce’s conservatism is consistent with his better-known theory of inquiry and 2) argues that his conservatism is an outgrowth of his fallibilism and his appreciation of the dynamics of hypothesis correction. Underlying these explicit arguments, however, is 3) an implicit argument that emerges over the course of the paper to the effect that Peirce’s conservatism is worth serious reconsideration. Now more than ever, as research into the evolution of prosocial behavior, the moral emotions, the influence of affect on cognition, and the cognitive science of religion indicate the continuities between emotion and rationality, between “hot and cold” cognition, we need a more general theory of inquiry that works to reconcile interested, instinctual modes of fixing belief and disinterested, rational modes of decision making. Peirce offers the beginning of such a theory.