Abstract

This dissertation explores the idea that social emotions play a crucial role in the institutions of morality. I urge that evolutionary theory can contribute to our understanding of morality, even if we take seriously the lessons of the "Naturalistic Fallacy." The first part investigates the Problem of Altruism: how is altruism possible if behavior is shaped by natural selection? I review Darwin's answer to this question, and find it fruitful but inadequate. I discuss the contributions of Kin Selection, Reciprocal Altruism, Group Selection, Indirect Reciprocity and Tit for Tat to the evolution of altruism. If these processes can help us understand anything about our moral practices, this will stem from the operations of the conflicting motivational tendencies that they instill and/or support. ;I review recent work in Evolutionary Psychology, defending that discipline's modular approach to explaining human behavior. I argue that our capacities for social emotions are specialized adaptations for the demands of social life in a species where abilities to cooperate effectively and to compete for social status are crucial determinants of the fitness of most individuals. Particular attention is paid to Anger, Guilt, Shame, Disdain, Approbation, Admiration, and Anxiety. I explore recent psychological findings on empathy and consider their consequences for ethics as well. ;In the second part , I ask what role emotions play in the cognitively sophisticated practices of evaluative judgment and discourse. In this connection, I defend the "second order sentiment theories" of Allan Gibbard, John McDowell, and David Wiggins. I suggest that ethical concepts which depend upon these emotional capacities are especially important for the prospects of fruitful normative discourse and reflection. Their ties to shared human sentiments make possible important forms of normative convergence and meaningful disagreement which are otherwise difficult to achieve among people with divergent ethical views. Some such concepts may appropriately be understood as "response dependent"-others may not. I explore the relationship between response-dependency and reasons for action. I suggest that certain forms of emotional experience present us with apparent reasons to act. This suggests a new strategy for understanding claims about "internalism" in moral philosophy. It is in virtue of their connection to shared human sentiments that certain sorts of ethical concepts can be said to provide those who use them with shared reasons to act. This raises special problems for the canonical concept of the morality system: wrongness.