Probability, symmetry and frequency

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (2):107-128 (1985)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We consider the meaning of the assignment of probabilities to events implied by the kind of model regularly used by Statisticians. Traditional frequentist understandings are reviewed and rejected. It is argued that many statistical models may be justified purely on the basis of the symmetry properties enjoyed by the observables being modelled.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,459

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
77 (#274,408)

6 months
17 (#179,757)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Theories of probability.Colin Howson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):1-32.
Empiricism, Probability, and Knowledge of Arithmetic.Sean Walsh - 2014 - Journal of Applied Logic 12 (3):319–348.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Patterns of Discovery.Karl R. Popper & Norwood R. Hanson - 1960 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 21 (2):266-268.
On the Concept of a Random Sequence.Alonzo Church - 1940 - Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 46 (2):130--135.
On the Concept of a Random Sequence.Alonzo Church - 1940 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 5 (2):71-72.
E. T. Jaynes, Papers On Probability, Statistics And Statistical Physics.[author unknown] - 1985 - Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 38 (2):179-180.

Add more references