Advanced Temporalising

In Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

There is a widespread assumption that B-theorists (according to whom there is nothing metaphysically special about the present moment in virtue of which it is present) should interpret the standard tense operators (‘it was the case that’, ‘it will be the case that’) as implicit quantifier-restrictors – so that, for example, an utterance at instant t of the sentence ‘It was the case that there are dinosaurs’ is true just in case there are dinosaurs located at some instant t* earlier than t. However, it is easy to show that this interpretation of the tense operators creates serious problems for B-theorists when combined with certain other relatively uncontroversial B-theoretic assumptions. In this paper, I argue that the best way for B-theorists to respond to these problems is to treat the standard tense operators as redundant when the sentences in their scope are qualitative (i.e. not about any particular individuals).

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

An approach to tense logic.R. A. Bull - 1970 - Theoria 36 (3):282-300.
An A-theory without tense operators.Meghan Sullivan - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5):735-758.
Timeless Truth.Andrea Iacona - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Andrea Iacona (eds.), Around the Tree: Semantic and Metaphysical Issues Concerning Branching and the Open Future. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
Timeless Truth.Andrea Iacona - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Andrea Iacona (eds.), Around the Tree: Semantic and Metaphysical Issues Concerning Branching and the Open Future. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
Inconsistency in the A-Theory.Nicholas J. J. Smith - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):231 - 247.
‘Now’ and ‘Then’ in Tense Logic.Ulrich Meyer - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2):229-247.
A-theory for b-theorists.Josh Parsons - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):1-20.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-01-18

Downloads
410 (#67,740)

6 months
78 (#75,587)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Daniel Deasy
University College Dublin

Citations of this work

A Temporal Comparison Argument for Presentism.Dan Marshall - 2022 - Philosophical Perspectives 36 (1):182-215.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
To Be F Is To Be G.Cian Dorr - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):39-134.
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642-647.
Scientific Thought.C. D. Broad - 1923 - Paterson, N.J.,: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

View all 30 references / Add more references