Abstract

War of Ideas: On Feyerabend’s Epistemic Pluralism and the Polarising Effect of Alternative Truths Paul Feyerabend is generally known as one of science’s greatest advocates of (epistemic) pluralism. Throughout his work, Feyerabend rejects the notion of a monistic epistemology and defends various forms of pluralism. Consequently, he is sometimes reproached for being responsible for the emergence of alternative truths – a radical form of pluralism – in the current post-truth era. This paper discusses the negative effects of alternative truths and the extent to which a solution for these effects is provided by Feyerabend’s theory of science. After narrowly defining alternative truths, it is concluded that alternative truths can have a polarising effect that may impede the progress of knowledge. At first glance, Feyerabend’s pluralistic theory does not acknowledge this downside of alternative truths. However, this paper argues that Feyerabend’s exclusion of cranks, as well as his (critical) view on reason, can be seen as possible limitations of his (epistemic) pluralism. The problem of alternative truths, therefore, is not necessarily an argument against Feyerabend’s theory of science.