Subject to No Man's Humor: Punishment in a Liberal Order
Dissertation, Bowling Green State University (
2002)
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Abstract
Over two million people in the United States are in penal custody either by the states or the federal government. There is virtually no agreement as to what this policy is intended to accomplish. Since Plato, considerable effort has been made by philosophers, legal scholars, psychologists, and sociologists to work out a viable justification for state punishment of criminals. This is another such attempt. ;This is an attempt to justify state punishment in a liberal order. It begins with a question: can punishment be justified in a purely retributive way? In chapter one, I lay out the question, discuss some preliminary questions and outline the structure of the argument in the remaining chapters. In chapter two, I discuss the concepts of personhood, project pursuit and crime. In chapter three, I explore crime in detail as a deviant project, by which I mean a project that is pursued by predating on others, thus limiting the freedom of others and expanding the freedom of the criminal. In chapter four I discuss liberalism. In chapter four, I discuss the problem of punishment. I start with a definition of state punishment. I then identify three aspects of punishment that require justification. I then outline two tests for any punishment theory. I then give a brief overview of the problems with the existing theories and a brief introduction of my proposal for a justificatory theory. In chapter six, seven, eight and nine I discuss in detail the major theories that have been proposed and show why I believe they fail. In chapter ten, I describe the theory I am advancing. I start by showing how it avoids the problems of the other theories. Finally, I show how it both furthers and respects the tenets of liberalism. I conclude by addressing some possible criticisms to my theory. In chapter eleven, I discuss the state's role in punishment. I address four justifications for the state's role in punishment. I conclude with some comments on the constraints liberalism places on a punishment theory and how, I believe, the theory I advance meets these constraints