Body and power: Nietzsche, Spinoza, and adapted sport

Sport, Ethics and Philosophy:1-18 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

This article explores the concepts of power as articulated in the philosophies of Nietzsche and Spinoza, applying them to the context of adapted sport for athletes with physical disabilities. Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power emphasizes surpassing limits and continuous creative self-overcoming, whereas Spinoza’s concept of conatus focuses on self-preservation and the enhancement of one’s power to act. To narrow the scope and enable an in-depth analysis of the relationship between power and physicality, this study specifically addresses physical disabilities, deliberatery excluding both sensorial and intellectual disabilities. The primary aim is to investigate how these philosophical perspectives can illuminate the subjective experience of physical empowerment and identity formation in athletes with disabilities. The study argues that adapted sport provides a space in which athletes can achieve existential transcendence and self-affirmation by combining rational self-knowledge, inspired by Spinoza’s philosophy, with the Nietzschean drive to continually trascend bodily limitations. Through this theoretical synthesis, adapted sport is portrayed as a tangible sphere of personal transformation, growth, and redefinition of bodily potential.

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