Abstract

The hegemony of the Inference to the Best Explanation as the rule which scientists follow in theorizing has been challenged in recent debates in philosophy of science by the concept of Symmetry. Inference to the Best Explanation as part of the Realist view of science has been most ably defended by David Armstrong. The concept of Symmetry, as part of the Constructive Empiricist view of science, is championed by Bas van Fraassen. If van Fraassen's Symmetry Principles are to become the rules which all scientists follow, one would need to provide a rationally compelling reason to persuade us to abandon Scientific Realism in favor of Constructive Empiricism. Conversely, if Armstrong wanted all scientists to be Scientific Realists in their use of IBE, then he would have to provide a rationally compelling reason to do so. Part of such a project must include showing that to hold the opposing view would comn-dt one to an irrational position. But it is clear that both Scientific Realism and Constructive Empiricism are within the bounds of what is rational. Since neither view can be shown to be rationally compelling, we must ask whether one is rationally preferable to the other. There are two types of competition in deciding whether one theory is rationally preferable to another. These are the philosophical theory competition and the scientific theory competition. Relying on the former seems to result in the victory of Scientific Realism, while relying on the latter results in the victory of Constructive Empiricism. I argue that this particular conflict belongs in the philosophical theory competition, with the result that Scientific Realism, and with it IBE, should be the dominant account of science