Paradoxical Emotion: On sui generis Emotional Irrationality

In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press (2003)
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Abstract

Weakness of will violates practical rationality; but may also be viewed as an epistemic failing. Conflicts between strategic and epistemic rationality suggest that we need a superordinate standard to arbitrate between them. Contends that such a standard is to be found at the axiological level, apprehended by emotions. Axiological rationality is sui generis, reducible to neither the strategic nor the epistemic. But, emotions are themselves capable of raising paradoxes and antinomies, particularly when the principles they embody involve temporality. They constitute an ultimate court of appeal, yet their biological origin allows little hope that these antinomies can be resolved.

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Author Profiles

Ronnie de Sousa
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Ronald De Sousa
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

Citations of this work

Truth, Authenticity, and Rationality.Ronald De Sousa - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (3):323-345.
What a Difference Emotions Make.Sabine A. Döring - 2010 - In Timothy O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 191–199.
Against Emotional Modularity.Ronald De Sousa - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):29-50.

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