Millikan über natürliche und intentionale Zeichen

Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (6):893-912 (2010)
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Abstract

In this paper, I look at Millikan′s theory of local natural signs as presented in Varieties of Meaning. I try to make sense of the exact way Millikan relates the notion of natural signs with intentional signs. Compared to traditional views, for instance in semiotics, Millikan′s approach represents, as I see it, a remarkable theoretical progress in clarifying the conditions under which organisms can interpret and use natural signs as elementary representations. This approach is also helpful for illustrating more clearly in what way teleosemantics must be based on an independent theory of representation and should take on a non-dretskenean, consumer-orientated form

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