Supposition and (Statistical) Models

Philosophy of Science:1-12 (forthcoming)
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Abstract

In a recent paper, Sprenger (2019) advances what he calls a “suppositional” answer to the question of why a Bayesian agent’s degrees of belief should align with the probabilities found in statistical models. We show that Sprenger’s account trades on an ambiguity between hypothetical and subjunctive suppositions and cannot succeed once we distinguish between the two.

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10.1017/psa.2023.17

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Corey Dethier
University of Minnesota

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